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Abstract 
Chance and necessity are mainstays of explanation in current biology, dominated by the neo-Darwinian outlook, a blend of the 
theory of evolution by natural selection with the basic tenets of population genetics. In such a framework the form of living organ-
isms is somehow a side effect of highly contingent, historical accidents. Thus, at a difference of other sciences, biology apparently 
lacks theoretical principles that in a law-like fashion may explain the emergence and persistence of the characteristic forms of 
living organisms that paradoxically, given the current importance attributed to chance, can be grouped into organized structural 
typologies. Nevertheless, the present essay shows that since its origins in Aristotelian natural history, biology aimed at achieving 
rational, non-accidental, explanations for the wide variety of living forms endowed with characteristic behaviors that constitute 
the landscape of biological species.
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1. Introduction
…when any one of the parts or structures, be it, which it 
may, is under discussion, it must not be supposed that 
it is its material composition to which attention is be-
ing directed or which is the object of the discussion, but 
the relation of such part to the total form. Similarly, the 
true object of architecture is not bricks, mortar, or tim-
ber, but the house; and so the principal object of natural 
philosophy is not the material elements, but their com-
position, and the totality of the form, independently of 
which they have no existence. (PA, I. 5, 645a 30-35)
The explanation of natural phenomena is a central goal 
of science. However, there is a need for criteria able to 
discriminate between scientific explanations and other 
sorts of explanations such as mythological, religious, 
traditional, etc. Scientific explanations are based on 
rules or principles considered as natural laws. Thus 
scientific explanations are attempts for establishing no-
mological (according to law) connections between phe-
nomena (Kim, 1964). Every explanation constitutes and 
argument or set of arguments but true explanation is 
achieved when we become aware that the phenomenon 
explained has been fitted within a system of rationally 
justified beliefs present in our mind (Ponce, 1987). An 
important aspect of scientific explanation is the absent 
or minimal appeal to historical accidents, as the expla-
nation is supported on principles that determine the 
course or organization of natural systems. However, 
the current standing of neo-Darwinism as the central 
guiding paradigm in contemporary biology, implies that 
historical explanations are the mainstay in biology. This 
situation derives from Darwin’s assumption that living 
organisms continuously undergo small but random he-
reditary changes on which natural selection impinges, 
thus selecting the variants that are better adapted to the 
standing environment. Therefore, evolutionary change 
depends on the continuous random variation among the 
individuals that constitute a given species. Yet behind 
this assumption reasonably supported by evidence, 
there is another one rather questionable but sponsored 
implicitly or explicitly by most neo-Darwinists: any sort 
of life form may result from such piecemeal variations 
provided that it survives (Denton, 1988). Thus, it is as-
sumed that living systems may display any set of pheno-
typical traits if such traits happen to be adapted to the 
current environment. 
According to this view there are no laws or princi-
ples of structural and functional organization proper to 
biology and so, biology becomes a collection of histori-
cal narratives; for example: which species derives from 
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which ancestors and under which historical circum-
stances, since the only necessary constraint is survival. 
Thus at a difference of other sciences, such as physics 
and chemistry, in which basic, law-like principles of 
organization allow to understand the observed struc-
tures in terms of regularities, biology is not intelligible 
in a law-like fashion but only in terms of survival, given 
that natural selection is currently posed as the only true 
explanatory principle in biology (Dobzhansky, 1973). 
Therefore, neo-Darwinian biology lacks principles able 
to explain why it appeared such a robust structure as the 
tetrapod limb and so, it should be acknowledged that 
the theoretical framework of current biology is rather 
limited when compared to the intellectual milieu of the 
rational morphologists from the XVIII and XIX centu-
ries, such as Richard Owen, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire or 
Georges Cuvier. 
Modern genetics sustained by molecular biology 
provides reasonable mechanistic explanations for a 
vast number of phenotypical traits that distinguish the 
members of a given species from those members of an-
other species. Such piecemeal variations are the fuel 
of speciation, understood as the superficial diversifi-
cation of a basic morphological type, given that such a 
process do not lead to the emergence of new organs or 
structures or in other words, such piecemeal variation 
explains microevolution but it cannot explain macro-
evolution. Moreover, genetics cannot explain the origin 
of the whole form typical of a given species. These lim-
itations pose the question of whether the explanations 
based on historical accidents are truly the mainstay for 
biology and so this scientific discipline must renounce 
to achieve rational explanations supported on law-like 
principles. However, a survey of the biological treatises 
of Aristotle, acknowledged in the Western tradition as 
the founder of biology, suggests that since its origins bi-
ology aimed at finding general principles, supported on 
both observation and reason, so that the explanations 
based on chance or historical accidents would perform 
only a marginal role in biology.
2. The biological treatises of Aristotle
The term biology appeared for the first time in La-
marck’s Hydrogeologia, published in 1802, and there 
is no equivalent term for it in the works of Aristotle 
and yet, it is an accepted fact that the collected works 
of Aristotle contain a large number of observations and 
theoretical reflections concerning issues that in current 
terms fall within the domains of zoology, comparative 
anatomy, physiology, embryology, botany and ecology, 
disciplines that conform a large portion of the contem-
porary landscape of biology. For Aristotle the study of 
living beings was a fundamental aspect of the study of 
nature. Indeed, a survey of the classical Becker, refer-
ence edition of Aristotle collected works, indicates that 
from a total of 1,462 pages, 426 (∼ 30%) deal on bio-
logical subjects. The main Aristotelian works dealing on 
biological matters are History of Animals (HA), Parts 
of Animals (PA), Generation of Animals (GA), Move-
ment of Animals, Progression of Animals and On the 
Soul (OS). On the other hand, careful analysis carried 
out by some classical scholars in the past century, in-
dicated that Aristotle’s biological treatises correspond 
to his mature philosophical perspective that illumi-
nates his logic, physics and metaphysics (Grene, 1963, 
During, 1966). However, although others scholars have 
challenged this conclusion (Graham, 1986) it is hard to 
refute that Aristotle’s biology is a foundation stone for 
his philosophy (Thomson, 1913; 1940).
3. The concept of nature in Aristotle
For Aristotle the most important concept in relation 
to nature is that of end or purpose (telos). Aristotle ap-
plies this concept to both animate and inanimate ob-
jects as he assumes that any material body has a specific 
nature or essence (physis/ousia) that rules its behavior 
and so it drives the material body to find a proper place 
or to achieve a particular condition. Therefore, terres-
trial objects move towards the center of the Earth while 
fire rises up and away from the center. For Aristotle 
change/movement is the process by which a given na-
ture (essence) may achieve its inherent purpose. When 
such a purpose is not yet realized, it is regarded as being 
potentially (dynamis/dunamis) but when that purpose 
is achieved then it becomes actualized. Thus, Aristot-
le defines change/movement as the actualization of a 
potentiality, and such actuality (entelechy) of a former 
potential is an end or completion of something (During, 
1990, p. 952-956). This view is quite in contrast with that 
of contemporary physics in which the laws of movement 
are the same for any sort of matter. Indeed, modern 
physics considers matter as constituted by finite kinds 
of elementary particles and that the whole phenomenol-
ogy of the universe is the consequence of the positions 
and movements of such elementary particles. However, 
Aristotle was skeptic that the mere spatial movement of 
particles could explain all types of change, for him the 
qualitative differences among substances were real and 
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so qualitative changes cannot be reduced to variations 
in the position or movement of elementary particles. 
That is why he rejected the atomic theory of Democritus. 
Thus, Aristotle postulates that there is a prime matter 
(proto-hyle) that is a general, indefinite substrate with 
potential to be transformed into a specific substance 
when it is endowed with a specific form (eidos/morphe/
soul). Such a form is the essential property of a given 
substance that becomes what it should be. Therefore, all 
material bodies are conceptually conformed by matter 
and form (hylomorphism) that are in the same relation-
ship as potency and act: prime, non-differentiated, mat-
ter has the potential to become something when it re-
ceives a given form (it becomes informed matter able to 
be perceived by the intellect). Thus. Aristotelian matter 
is quite different from the matter of contemporary sci-
entific materialism. For example, in Aristotelian terms 
the head of a sculpture has the shape but no the form of 
a real head, since it cannot perform the functions and 
purposes of a real human head. Moreover, for Aristo-
tle a human corpse has lost its soul which is the form 
of the living human and as such the corpse has lost its 
human essence, because what a thing is, is always deter-
mined by its function: a thing really is itself when it can 
perform its function; an eye, for instance, when it can 
see (Meteorology, IV. 12, 390a, 10). It must be stressed 
that for Aristotle the soul (psyche) is not a supernatural 
entity but it is the ‘first actuality’ of a natural body that 
has life potentially (OS, II. 1, 412a, 27). Thus, the soul 
of a living thing is the capacity to engage in processes 
or activities that are characteristic of the natural kind 
to which such a living thing belongs. Soul is the first ac-
tuality that drives animal development, that consists in 
a serial passage from potentiality to actuality, so that 
each actualization results in a further potentiality until 
the developing system achieves its end (telos): a fully 
completed and functional embodied form which is the 
culmination of such a development. Therefore, soul is 
the form of a living thing understood not as its figure or 
shape but as its actuality: that in virtue of which it is the 
kind of living thing that it actually is.
4. Causality in Aristotelian science
For Aristotle in order to proceed to explain some-
thing, we must first consider the following questions: 
what is the thing to be explained? And why there is such 
a thing? Both questions cannot be answered without 
the use of reason and so the explanation is equal to a 
reason for something to be, for something to occur (a 
logos). The logos establishes a relationship between the 
notion to be defined with another, more fundamental 
and defining notion, or a relationship between a given 
statement and another, foundational, demonstrative or 
proving statement. Our rational beliefs are organized 
upon such explanations. 
From the Aristotelian perspective, any theory aim-
ing at explaining the facts in the universe depends on 
the principle of causality. Therefore, we must ask what 
is a cause? Perhaps this word of the common language 
had its origin in the common human experience that 
through our deliberate actions we can produce chang-
es in the real world. Such changes are the effects and 
the actions that produce them are the causes. Bertrand 
Russell in a famous and very critical paper on the classi-
cal notion of cause (Russell, 1912) noticed that the con-
cept of cause is somehow linked to the notion of will 
(volition). Science, for Aristotle, is the knowledge based 
on causes, and the notion of cause is derived from the 
notion of principle. Thus every cause is a principle but 
not every principle is a cause. Therefore, a given cause 
is a principle for some things. In Aristotelian science a 
principle is everything from which something begins 
and a cause is everything from which something starts, 
either as movement or being. At the ontological level 
the causes are the principles of being but at the logical 
level the causes are the principles of knowledge. The de-
monstrative principles that rule the process of science 
result from abstractions based on causes, thus science is 
causal knowledge. The cause gives reason to the effect, 
phenomenon or thing and as such is both a principle 
of universality (conceptualization) and a principle of 
argumentation (demonstration). Therefore, given that 
cause is a foundation of reason, it becomes the core of 
any explanation.
5. The four Aristotelian causes
In classical times the notion of cause was loosely de-
fined until Aristotle undertook its analysis. The Greek 
term aitia used by Aristotle refers to everything that 
contributes to an effect and he suggested that for con-
stituting a new object we should consider four aspects: 
first we must consider the stuff necessary to make the 
object, this is the material cause. Then we must consider 
that which provides its specific nature to the object, this 
is the formal cause. Next we need to consider that which 
introduces the formal cause into the material cause, this 
is the efficient cause. Finally, we need to consider the 
reason or purpose by which the efficient cause acts on 
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the formal and material causes, this is the final cause. 
For example, when producing a statue depicting blind 
justice, the material cause is the block of marble, the 
formal cause is the figure to be sculpted upon the mar-
ble, the efficient cause is the craftsman with his tools 
sculpting the marble and the final cause is the concept 
or idea (blind justice) represented by the statue. Thus 
the Aristotelian doctrine of causality consists in deter-
mining the relationship among the four types of cause 
and somehow reinforces the link between the idea of 
cause and the notion of will since for example, in the 
Aristotelian cosmos the efficient cause of the celestial 
movements is an intelligence that operates in a fash-
ion analogous to human will. Nevertheless, we must be 
careful to point out that in the Aristotelian worldview 
the final cause does not implies the notion of an inten-
tional agent operating for achieving the constitution of 
a given object. For Aristotle the notion of final cause 
is close to that of function or purpose, so that the final 
cause for the eye is vision without implying a conscious 
designer shaping the eye for the purpose of vision. 
The current and common confusion of the final cause 
with a conscious agent results from a theological inter-
pretation of Aristotelian causality that equals divinity 
with the final cause. However, since Galileo the trend in 
science is to consider only material and efficient caus-
es when explaining the natural phenomena, and the 
ignorance of final causes is perhaps the consequence 
of avoiding, at any rate, a hint of religious outlook that 
may interfere with a neutral, objective description of 
nature. Nevertheless, for Aristotle the final cause is the 
main cause, because it causes the causality of the oth-
er three causes as they align towards an end. However, 
when considering the explanation of something Aristo-
tle assigns a chief role to the formal cause because the 
final cause is extrinsic while the formal cause is intrinsic 
to the process or phenomenon to be explained. Thus the 
formal cause is the one that unifies all the other causes. 
The causal perspective on knowledge and explanation in 
Aristotle aims at achieving the intelligibility of the for-
mal cause that is: of form. Aristotelian science proceeds 
by means of classification and argumentation, and in 
these cognitive endeavor the fundamental element is 
form. Thus in material bodies the part that bears intel-
ligibility is form while the one that poses a limit to cog-
nition is matter. From the epistemological perspective 
what is truly universal is that which is conceptualized 
be means of abstraction and this corresponds to form. 
Therefore, what we may truly know about matter is al-
ways through form and in relation with form. Hence, 
formal cause or form as such is both the principle of in-
telligibility and of universality.
Aristotle also suggested that causes might be grouped 
in pairs (GA, I. 1, 715a, 5-10). Sometimes the final and 
the formal cause can be considered as a single or the 
same cause, while the material and efficient causes may 
also be considered as very close entities. In PA book I, 
Aristotle describes his general method for the study of 
biological phenomena and yet there is no mention in 
it of the notion of natural law. In Aristotle’s epoch the 
notion of law was only applied to political or moral is-
sues. However, the Aristotelian way for describing nat-
ural phenomena strongly suggests the notion that there 
are regular, constant relationships between phenome-
na. Aristotle enunciates rules and principles akin to the 
contemporary notion of natural law but with a funda-
mental difference: he never suggests that such princi-
ples universally apply in a ruthless fashion, instead he 
suggests that they correspond to that which more often 
occurs, to that which generally happens. Moreover, the 
most fundamental principle that sustains Aristotelian 
biology it is never explicitly stated, although it is implic-
itly present in all the biological treatises after HA: all vi-
tal phenomena depend on natural causes, since Aristo-
tle never considers non-natural or supernatural causes 
for explaining biological phenomena. Thus, when Aris-
totle describes some monstrosity or biological anomaly, 
he never recurs to the action of displeased or malignant 
deities but explains these phenomena as the result of 
the interplay between natural causes. However, like Pla-
to, Aristotle doubts that natural phenomena may occur 
only for mechanical reasons. Indeed, in the first chapter 
of GA, Aristotle affirms that the production of natural 
phenomena requires the four types of cause. However, 
for Aristotle it is the final cause the one with the larg-
est capacity for explaining biological phenomena, even 
though he acknowledges that the material cause is im-
portant for explaining the accidental differences among 
members of a species, such as color of the eyes, of the 
skin, the pitch of voice or even monstrosities, given that 
such differences have no particular purpose.
6. Aristotle on necessity
Necessity has its origin in matter but Aristotle dis-
tinguishes two types of necessity: a simple one that only 
applies to things that are forever, things the causes of 
which cannot be other than they are, and another one 
that operates in the living world; the hypothetical ne-
cessity (Physics, II. 9, 200a, 13) that depends on an end 
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beyond itself, since the nature (form) of a living thing 
is the internal source of change within itself, the orga-
nizing principle that directs its development towards its 
particular end. If nature as form is prior to nature as 
matter, nature as that-toward-which, nature as end, is 
the biological manifestation of nature as form. There-
fore, that what shall be, the culmination of develop-
ment, controls necessity. Such is a necessity that flows 
backwards from the achieved telos to the process that 
leads to such an end or towards the structure of the 
parts that contribute to such an end. For example, in 
contemporary terms, the several global or local organiz-
ers described in varied embryonic developmental pro-
cesses, such as the Spemann organizer in amphibians, 
the Hensen node in the chick, and the equivalent node 
region in the mouse, might be the embodied manifesta-
tions of the hypothetical necessity that establishes a set 
of ’attractors’ along the developmental pathway that al-
low us to rationalize in a retrospective fashion the pro-
cess of ontogeny, in the same way that a satellite view of 
an earthly landscape allows us to understand and then 
to predict the course taken by water flowing upon such 
a landscape in its relentless voyage towards the ocean. 
Thus, necessity subordinated to end is what accord-
ing to Aristotle the true naturalist/biologist is seeking 
to understand. Moreover, for Aristotle the function of 
each part, of each organ can only be fully understood by 
relation to the whole:
For no bone in the body exists as a separate thing in it-
self, but each is either a portion of what may be consid-
ered a continuous whole, or at any rate is linked with 
the rest by contact and by attachments... And similarly 
no blood vessel has in itself a separate individuality; but 
they all form parts of one whole (PA, II. 9, 654a, 34-37; 
654b 1-3). 
7. Hypothetical necessity and 
contemporary attractors
For any dynamical system the phase space is the ab-
stract space in which all possible states of the system 
are represented, with each possible state correspond-
ing to a unique point in the phase space. That part of 
the phase space corresponding to the typical behavior 
of the dynamical system is known as the attracting set 
or attractor. More formally, for a dynamical system an 
attractor is a closed subset Γ from the system’s phase 
space so that, despite starting from multiple possible 
initial conditions, the system evolves towards that set. 
There is a debate on the origin of the concept of attrac-
tor, since attractors consisting of more than one point 
seem to have been first considered by Auslander, Bathia 
and Seibert, in a mathematical paper from 1964. How-
ever, also there is evidence that this neologism was al-
ready used in 1966 by the Fields’ medal mathematician 
René Thom to whom Stephen Smale, another Fields 
medal winner, attributes the neologism, (Thom, 2016). 
In any case, the concept of attractor reintroduces the 
final cause in the discourse of contemporary science. 
Attractors may be classified as steady-state, periodic or 
chaotic, but in essence any attractor corresponds to a 
steady-state akin to a state of minimum free-energy at 
the bottom of a “well of potential” that corresponds to a 
basin of stability, the basin where the attractor exerts its 
“strongest attraction”, thus precluding the system from 
leaving it too easily or not at all. 
Early in the twentieth century Hans Driesch ex-
perimentally demonstrated the teleological behavior 
of embryonic developing systems, by showing that a 
living embryo self-regulates to form a whole organism 
despite the removal of a significant part of its consti-
tuting material (in this case, one whole cell or blasto-
mere from an early two-cell stage embryo). Thus, at a 
difference of a purely mechanical device, the embryo 
remains a whole after the removal of some of its parts. 
Driesch fully assumed the epistemological consequenc-
es of such finding when suggesting that a guiding entel-
echy explains the wholeness and teleological behavior 
of embryonic developing systems (Driesch, 1908). This 
position is quite different to materialistic reductionism 
in which a living process is just a particular case of ma-
terial processes in general. 
The concept of potentiality generally refers to any 
“possibility” that a thing can be said to have. Neverthe-
less, Aristotle did not consider all possibilities the same, 
and emphasized the importance of those that become 
real of their own accord when conditions are right and 
nothing stops them (Sachs, 2015). On the other hand, ac-
tuality is the motion, change or activity that represents 
the exercise or fulfillment of a possibility, when a possi-
bility becomes real in the fullest sense (Durrant, 1993). 
Entelechy is an ancient Greek neologism (entelécheia) 
coined by Aristotle, that very often has been translated 
as ‘actuality’ (anything which is currently happening) 
but more recent translations suggest “being-at-work-
staying- the-same” or “being-at-an-end” (Sachs, 2005). 
Entelechy is then a kind of completeness, a continuous 
being-at-work, a specific way of being in motion. All 
things that actually exist are beings-at-work, and all of 
them have a tendency towards being-at-work in a par-
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ticular way that should be according to their proper 
and “complete” nature. Thus Driesch suggested that 
living things develop by entelechy, a purposive and or-
ganizing field that he conceived as “mind-like”, that is: 
non-spatial, intensive, and qualitative rather than spa-
tial, extensive, and quantitative (Driesch, 1908). Indeed, 
Driesch approach for explaining organic development 
was rooted in vitalism, understood as the notion that 
the processes of life are not explicable by the laws of 
physics and chemistry alone and so, that life is some-
how self-determining. 
The rise of molecular genetics in the second half 
of the twentieth century leads to a shift in the kind of 
experiments used in experimental embryology so that 
now most experiments on this topic are designed for 
putting into evidence the role of genes and their prod-
ucts as determinants of embryonic development. Ob-
viously, such experimental designs are not the right 
framework for studying things like entelechy. Indeed, 
experiments are on the one hand narrow windows and, 
on the other, contrived schemes for observing or asking 
questions to natural systems. Any experimental set up 
depends on implicit and explicit theoretical assump-
tions and that includes preconceptions or prejudices 
about the workings of nature. Therefore, experiments 
can only produce a limited set of answers that may be 
biased by the theoretical background. In other words, 
depending on the experimental system used, we may 
only see what it is already expected to be seen. On that 
account, the presence or activity of entelechy cannot be 
documented through the looking glass of the current 
experimental approach in reductionist biology, that dis-
cards formal and final causes from the causal analysis 
by concentrating only in the material and efficient caus-
es. This is exemplified by the following mock experi-
ment, suggested by René Thom: a fast car coming from 
an avenue crosses a bridge upon a river and gets into a 
further road where it hits and kills a passing pedestri-
an. The authorities want to determine what caused the 
death of the pedestrian. Thus, they fit a dummy in the 
original position of the killed pedestrian and then run a 
fast car starting from the original avenue but then blow 
up the bridge and so the car fells into the river unable 
to hit the dummy. From this experiment they conclude 
that the standing bridge was the cause of the pedestri-
an’s death. As pointed out by Thom, a lot of current 
experimental biology is carried out according to this 
weird experimental logic (Thom, 1990a). 
Attractors imply the actualization of a potential, 
hence when the system is at or “within” the attractor it 
may be said that it is being-at-work-staying-the-same 
or being-at-an-end. Moreover, since the attractor regu-
lates the behavior of the parts or elements of the sys-
tem (agents), this is a case of top-down or downward 
causation (from the complex or global to the simple 
or partial), completely different from the bottom-up 
causation that tries to explain the behavior of a complex 
system as the additive result of the properties of its el-
ementary constituents. In principle, when a dynamical 
system is not yet in the attractor such an attractor lies in 
the future of the system. Thus, by definition attractors 
are non-spatial entities, at least not in Euclidean space. 
Even more, an attractor corresponds to a form of behav-
ior or activity for the system and as such it is a qual-
itative entity besides being intensive, as it determines 
the behavior of the system once “within” the attractor. 
Therefore, all the properties attributed by Driesch to 
entelechy can be also predicated about attractors. For 
many dynamical systems there is more than one attrac-
tor, and the development or evolution of very complex 
dynamical systems (such as living systems) implies vis-
iting several attractors in time until reaching one among 
those included in the set with foremost stability. 
Purely physical self-organizing systems such as the 
Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, currents in electrical 
circuits or the atmospheric winds, have their specific 
attractors (e.g., the BZ, van der Pol and Lorenz attrac-
tors) for which there are defined mathematical descrip-
tions. However, things like cellular phenotypes or the 
behavior of living flocks correspond to higher-order 
attractors for which no thorough mathematical descrip-
tion exists for the time being. We may conceive further 
higher-order attractors that correspond to the typical 
morphologies of whole living systems. If such is the 
case, then evolution of life on earth would not be just 
a chancy, historical and arbitrary process (as claimed 
by neo-Darwinism) but an exploration of life’s phase 
space in which there is a collection of attractors that 
correspond to possible stable typologies that define an 
Aristotelian scala naturae or great chain of being (By-
num, 1975). Therefore, although there is a common ba-
sic mathematical definition that may be applied to any 
attractor, there are different categories of attractors (in 
the same fashion that Driesch suggested the existence of 
different sorts of entelechies) which cannot be reduced 
to a single common mathematical description, and so 
higher-order attractors cannot be reduced to lower level 
attractors nor systems bound by nature to lower level 
attractors can truly interact with higher level attractors.
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Do attractors exist or are they mere intellectual con-
structions? And if such is the case, how it is possible for 
an abstract entity to influence a process with a material 
substrate? This sort of vexed question is characteristic 
of current biological science that is trapped within the 
mindset of naïve positivism and its fear of metaphysi-
cal entities. However, Thom suggested that science re-
curs to the theoretical perspective for reducing the ar-
bitrariness of phenomenological descriptions engaged 
by proximate causes (Thom, 1980; Thom, 1990b) and 
for him any theory implies the existence of imaginary 
entities that are postulated to exist and correspond to 
the vectors of causality linking cause and effect (Thom, 
1990a). Thus, in cosmology and physics one may speak 
of “superstrings”, “time-warps”, “gluons” or “charmed 
quarks” without worrying about the fact that such en-
tities are not endowed with rock-hard materiality. The 
explanatory and predictive success of deep physical 
theories is based on introducing many levels of ab-
straction, from objects to microscopic entities to parti-
cles to force fields to probability distribution functions, 
and the like. All these theoretical entities are based on 
metaphysical requirements that are applied de facto by 
scientists when working with such theories (Margenau, 
1977). On the contrary, in experimental biology there 
is fear, for example, of exploring a morphogenetic field 
that cannot be weighed, measured with a ruler or ob-
served under the microscope. This limitation of cur-
rent biology for assuming virtual or theoretical entities 
makes it walk in circles and thus hinders its possibilities 
for reaching deeper understanding. 
8. The limited role of chance in 
Aristotelian biology
Chance is excluded from Aristotelian causality since 
for Aristotle fantasy and disorder cannot be causal 
factors in nature. Indeed, Aristotle considers that the 
same causes generally produce the same effects as he 
acknowledges a regular behavior in nature from which 
some general rules may be inferred. For example, he 
suggests that animals endowed with a large number 
of teeth usually live longer than those with a reduced 
number. Also, he suggests that animals that produce 
less yellow bile live longer than those that produce more 
of it. To the contemporary mind such statements may 
look useless or naïve but nevertheless they reflect the 
will to find general principles that correlate with specif-
ic biological phenomena. Thus Aristotle proposes that 
the character and sensitivity of an animal depends on 
the quality of its blood so that an animal with blood of 
a lesser density is more intelligent and vivacious, while 
animals devoid of red blood are generally fearful (PA, II. 
4, 650b, 20-35). Animals with a large heart are gener-
ally shy while those with a relatively compact heart are 
assertive (PA, III. 4, 667a, 15).
 Aristotle also derives some principles from his stud-
ies on comparative anatomy. For example, he proposes 
that only viviparous animals with lungs have epiglottis. 
Also he proposes that red-blooded animals always move 
using at most four points of mechanical support. There-
fore, those animals that use more than four points of 
support are unlikely to be red-blooded. Thus, starting 
from the previous principle Aristotle explains why birds 
while red-blooded are biped, as they have two wings 
and so if they were endowed with four legs they would 
have more than four points of support, something that 
is impossible for red-blooded animals. Another Aristo-
telian rule of animal movement is that all animals with 
legs have them in pairs. In the case of quadrupeds Aris-
totle notes that such animals always move by a diagonal 
movement of their legs: the movement of the right an-
terior leg is followed by that of the left posterior leg, that 
one of the left anterior leg is always followed by that of 
the right posterior leg.
 Some Aristotelian principles apply to the whole of 
the animal kingdom: all animals are made from the 
same natural substances or elements: earth, wind, fire 
and water, and all animals inhabit in one of these el-
ements or in a milieu dominated by one of them. For 
example, fish in water and birds on air. Another gen-
eral principle is that all animals must feed themselves 
in order to grow and develop; no animal escapes this 
rule no matter how ephemeral it might be. Indeed, in 
modern physiology survives the Aristotelian rule that 
when in an animal a small change in a first principle 
(such as gender/sex) undergoes a sudden change, then 
a number of details that depend on such a principle are 
also modified (GA, I. 2, 716b, 2-10). Aristotle offers the 
example of castrated animals, in which the elimination 
of small distinctive organs (testicles) leads to a transfor-
mation in body appearance, physiology and behavior of 
the animal. Thus: 
small changes are the causes of great ones, not per se but 
when it happens that a principle changes with them. For 
the principles, though small in size, are great in potency 
(GA, V. 7, 788a, 11-13). 
Moreover, differences between the major animal 
families are also explained on the basis of the previous 
rule, for example: 
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And so by the occurrence of modification in minute or-
gans it comes to pass that one animal is terrestrial and 
the other aquatic, in both senses of these terms (HA, 
VIII. 2, 590a, 4-6).
Aristotle establishes a correlation between the celes-
tial bodies, not generated and imperishable, and living 
beings, subjected to generation and corruption, for then 
affirming that both kinds of beings are worth of study 
and admiration since there is beauty in every work of 
nature. In animals, beauty is rooted in the subordina-
tion of the parts to become a whole so as to achieve an 
end or purpose, while in the case of celestial bodies the 
regularity of their movements are a manifestation of or-
der in nature. Thus for Aristotle the vital functions are 
the subject of wonder in the same fashion as the regu-
lar movements in the heavens, as they bear witness to 
the existence of purpose in nature (PA, I. 5). Moreover, 
according to Aristotle the observation of the universe 
leads to the conclusion that nature makes nothing in 
vain and such a principle is also manifested in the prop-
erties of animals (OS, III. 12, 434a, 30-32). In both Ar-
istotelian cosmology and biology nature always knows 
what it wants and where it goes, never acting lightly or 
capriciously. For example, the fact that fish do not have 
eyelids is not by chance but the consequence that such 
structures made for protecting the eyes from dust and 
air impurities are completely useless in water that poses 
a hindrance to sharp vision but where, according to Ar-
istotle, there are less objects that may knock against the 
eyes and so, instead of providing eyelids to fish, nature 
has given them eyes of fluid consistency so a to coun-
terbalance the opacity of water (PA, II. 13, 685a, 7-10).
9. The equilibrium and the economy 
principles of Aristotelian biology
The conformation of animals is for Aristotle the 
source of important considerations. He notices that a 
large number of animals present a bilateral symmetry 
and so they have right and left halves, therefore most 
organs are distributed in pairs. Such a symmetry is a 
manifestation of equilibrium and beauty. Thus the prin-
ciple of equilibrium is fundamental for explaining the 
forms of animals: 
all influences require to be counterbalanced, so that they 
may be reduced to moderation and brought to the mean 
(for in the mean, and not in either extreme, lies their 
substance and account (PA, II. 7, 652b, 16-18). 
Therefore, nature always knows how to compen-
sate the excess of something by the juxtaposition of its 
contrary. The equilibrium principle is also the basis for 
the Aristotelian way of explaining the place occupied 
by certain organs and for justifying their role in the 
physiology of the corresponding animal. For example, 
given that Aristotle had no real clue about the role of 
the brain, but starting from the principle of equilibri-
um coupled to the notion that nature makes nothing in 
vain, he suggests that the brain is a counterpoise to the 
heart as container of vital heat, because the body needs 
a structure for attenuating the heat emanating form the 
heart, and such is the brain (PA, II. 7, 652b, 20-26). 
Moreover, the fact that in humans the tip of the heart is 
displaced towards the left side is not by chance, but for 
compensating the heat loss from the left half of the body 
which, according to Aristotle and for reasons related to 
the actual distribution of tissues, it cools down in man 
quicker than in other animals (PA, III. 4, 666b, 8-11). 
On the other hand, the spleen has its place in the left up-
per abdominal quadrant so as to be the counterpoise of 
the liver located in the right upper abdominal quadrant.
In Aristotelian biology the exceptional development 
of a function or organ always occurs at the expense of 
another function or organ. This is a most fundamental 
rule. Therefore, no animal possesses both tusks and 
horn, nor yet do either of these exist in any animal en-
dowed with saw-teeth (HA, II. 1, 501a, 18-19) accord-
ingly then:
it would appear consistent with reason that the single 
horn should go with the solid rather than with the clo-
ven hoof. For hoof, whether solid or cloven, is of the 
same nature as horn; so that the two naturally undergo 
division simultaneously and in the same animals. Again, 
since the division of the cloven hoof depends on defi-
ciency of material, it is but rationally consistent, that na-
ture, when she gave an animal an excess of material for 
the hoofs, which thus became solid, should have taken 
away something from the upper parts and so made the 
animal to have but one horn (PA, III. 2, 663a, 28-35). 
In the case of birds, the development of legs can only 
occur at the expense of the development of wings for fly-
ing. Thus wading birds have solid legs but fragile wings 
and they have reduced the size of their caudal feathers 
because, according to Aristotle, the matter necessary for 
increasing the size of the legs it is obtained at the ex-
pense of the stuff necessary for making feathers. That 
is why wadding birds when flying use their legs as rud-
ders, as they lack the large caudal feathers that other 
birds use for the same purpose. In case of crustaceans, 
the lack of claws in shrimp is explained on the fact that 
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they possess a larger number of legs than their lobster 
relatives.
The equilibrium principle also allows Aristotle to ex-
plain how the organism works. Thus for Aristotle it is 
not by chance that during pregnancy and lactation the 
menstrual cycle is suspended since the stuff for nour-
ishing the embryo is equivalent to milk and similar to 
that shed with menstruation and so:
“if the secretion is diverted in the one direction it must 
needs cease in the other, unless some violence is done con-
trary to the general rule. But this is as much as to say that it 
is contrary to nature, for in all cases where it is not impos-
sible for things to be otherwise than they generally are but 
whether they may so happen, still what is the general rule is 
what is according to nature” (GA, IV. 8, 777a, 16-21).
Aristotle also establishes a correlation between the 
typical size of the animals of a given species and their 
progeny, so that large bodied animals have less prog-
eny than small bodied animals, and even in the vege-
tal world the smaller plants produce a larger number 
of seeds than the larger ones. Indeed, the following 
principle: “every organism constitutes an ensemble, a 
unique and closed system in which all parts are mutu-
ally interlocked and concur towards the same action 
by means of reciprocal reaction”, known as the prin-
ciple of organic and functional correlation, enunciated 
in the XIX century by Georges Cuvier, was based on the 
equilibrium principle of Aristotelian biology. 
The principle of economy is another fundamental 
principle of Aristotelian biology. Such principle estab-
lishes that for obtaining a specific end or result nature 
always uses the least quantity of matter enough for 
achieving such a purpose. Thus the bones of vertebrates 
are not completely solid but more like thick but hollow 
tubes. The great length of the intestines is justified be-
cause it allows for a slower but more complete assimila-
tion of food so as not to waste too much of it. In sharks 
the location of the mouth is justified so that they cannot 
swallow too much food in a single bite. Moreover, Aris-
totle notices that often nature use the very same organ 
for different functions. Thus the mouth has as prima-
ry function to be the gate for food ingestion but it also 
functions for the emission of voice and even as a de-
fense or weapon (PA, III. 1, 662a, 20-24). However, this 
is not a universal rule as shown by the separation of the 
proboscis and the sting in bees, while in dipterans both 
parts and functions are integrated in a single organ. 
Therefore, nature does not apply the economy principle 
at any rate, instead the economy of organs and func-
tions it is always for the sake of obtaining the best result 
for each particular species. For Aristotle the principle of 
economy is also manifested in the fact that nature pro-
vides specific organs only to such animals able to use 
them. Thus nature always provides the organ compati-
ble with the function: 
For it is better plan to take a person who is already a 
flute-player and give him a flute, than to take one who 
possesses a flute and teach him the art of flute-playing. 
For nature adds that which is less to that which is great-
er and more important, and not that which is more valu-
able and greater to that which is less (PA, IV. 10, 687a, 
13-17). 
Aristotle differs from Anaxagoras who suggested 
that man was the most intelligent animal because it is 
endowed with hands. Instead, Aristotle suggests that 
man has hands because it is the most intelligent animal 
and as such man is able to use properly a large number 
of tools. Therefore, given that man is able to acquire and 
practice diverse techniques, nature has provided man 
with the most useful tool of all: the hand. The Sophists 
philosophers liked to suggest that man was an inade-
quate, badly constituted being since it comes about na-
ked and barefooted but Aristotle challenges this view: 
For other animals have each but one mode of defense, 
and this they can never change, so that they must per-
form all the offices of life and even so to speak, sleep 
with sandals on, never laying aside whatever serves as 
a protection to their bodies, nor changing such single 
weapon as they may chance to possess. But to man nu-
merous modes of defense are open, and these, more-
over, he may change at will; as also he may adopt such 
weapon as he pleases, and at such places as suit him. 
For the hand is talon, hoof, and horn, at will. So too it is 
spear, and sword, and whatever other weapon or instru-
ment you please; for all these can it be from its power of 
grasping and holding them all (PA, IV. 10, 687a, 25-30; 
687b, 1-5).
10. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, for the contemporary mind many 
rules of Aristotelian biology are plainly mistaken or 
supported by erroneous observations and premature 
generalizations. However, Aristotle was the first thinker 
suggesting the need of finding general rules or princi-
ples derived from observations and not from a priori 
philosophical considerations, since as shown by Aristo-
telian scholars: searching the works of Aristotle for sci-
entific demonstrations based on a priori first principles 
is rather fruitless. Indeed, most of the arguments from 
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most of the treatises do not look like assertions of defin-
ing phrases followed by deductions from these. Most of 
them appear not demonstrative, but inductive, dialecti-
cal, or aporetic. They move from common experience or 
common opinions, weighing the views of others or an-
alyzing difficulties, in hope of arriving at (but not start-
ing from) an insight into some specific nature (Grene, 
1972). Yet, Aristotelian scientific explanation aims at 
establishing the reasons for phenomena to occur. Thus 
Aristotle outlook differs from that of contemporary sci-
ence more interested in how phenomena occur so as to 
achieve predictive power upon them, instead of search-
ing for a deep understanding of occurring phenomena. 
A basic Aristotelian principle that still permeates 
contemporary science states that the same causes must 
produce the same effects. This statement acknowledges 
the regularity of nature and so the possibility of achiev-
ing stable, communicable knowledge about nature. In-
spired by this principle Aristotle tried to find rational 
explanations for biological phenomena. 
However, an essential function attributed to cau-
sality is the possibility of inferring the future from the 
past and any system in which such inference is possi-
ble it is considered a “deterministic” system in which 
an event or sets of events are the determinants, that is 
the factors determining the system. Russell, as previ-
ously mentioned, was very critical of the old notion of 
cause and so he considered that that the statement “the 
same causes produce the same effects” was an unduly 
simplified, given that when the whole context of a phe-
nomenon is considered then it looks very unlikely that 
the same cause produces the same effect as a matter of 
ruthless repetition (For example, while striking a dry 
match usually leads to ignition, striking a wet match not 
necessarily leads to its ignition). Instead, he suggested 
that the assumed sameness of causes and effects actu-
ally rests on the sameness of relations among factors 
involved in determining a phenomenon, as this is im-
plied in the assumed constancy of natural laws (Russell, 
1912). Thus, this sameness of relations is an empirical 
generalization from a number of natural laws which are 
themselves empirical generalizations (something com-
pletely in agreement with the Aristotelian outlook that 
derived its rules and principles from empirical obser-
vations). Therefore, instead of the old formulation that 
the same causes produce the same effects, what it is 
really assumed by modern science is the uniformity of 
nature that implies the permanence of natural laws, as 
precondition for the possibility of scientific knowledge. 
Nevertheless, despite assuming the regularity of 
nature the Aristotelian outlook is not really concerned 
with the study of causes as a mean for achieving control 
upon nature (by being able to predict the future behav-
ior of the natural system studied). Indeed, Aristotelian 
explanation is deeply associated with the need for mak-
ing sense of natural phenomena, of finding meaning 
in them. This corresponds to understanding the form 
(or logos) of the phenomenon as well as its end or pur-
pose (telos). This in contrast with current biology that 
explains all vital phenomena as events derived from 
chance and necessity within a universe lacking any 
sense or meaning (Monod, 1970; Dawkins, 1986). And 
yet, modern biology, that stretches from molecular biol-
ogy to ecology, regularly uses teleological explanations 
(e.g., the shape of the beak in Darwin’s finches is the 
right one for chipping the sort of seed that constitutes 
the meal proper to each kind of finch) which are usually 
understood as a way of talking, imposed on us by the 
limitations of human language. Thus, it is quite a para-
dox that contemporary biologists continuously recur to 
meaning despite their sustained effort for avoiding it.
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